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ABDUCTING TERRORISTS UNDER PDD-39:
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING NEW
DOUGLAS KASH*
[I]t is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing
terrorists in international waters or airspace, from attacking them on the
soil of other nations.... International law requires no such result. A na-
tion attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or pre-empt
future attacks, to seize terrorists or rescue its citizens when no other
means is available.
-Former United States Secretary of State George Shultz
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I. INTRODUCTION
In early February 1997, headlines blared "U.S. OKs Kidnapping
Terrorists: Directive Apparently Declassified in Error;" 2 "U.S.
* Staff Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, U.S. Department of Justice. Mr. Kash is also an adjunct professor of criminal
law and criminal procedure at Northern Virginia Community College.
As a matter of policy, the Drug Enforcement Administration disclaims responsibility
for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed
herein are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the United
States Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration or any officer or
entity of the United States Government.
1. Bureau of Pub. Aff., U.S. Dep't of State, Current Pol'y No. 783, Low-
Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity 3 (1986).
2. U.S. OKs Kidnapping Terrorists: Directive Apparently Declassified in Er-
ror, CFI. TRIB., Feb. 5, 1997, at 10 (reporting that a presidential directive, inad-
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Willing to 'Snatch' Terrorists Part of Directive Inadvertently Re-
leased;" 3 "U.S. May Nab Terrorism Suspects, A Directive Indicates
We Would Snatch Suspects From Another Country if Necessary;",
4
"U.S. Authorities Allowed to Abduct Terrorists." 5 These headlines
referred to an unintentionally declassified presidential directive
signed by President William J. Clinton on June 21, 1995. The Presi-
dential Decision Directive, or PDD-39, stated in part:
We shall vigorously apply extraterritorial statutes to counter acts of ter-
rorism and apprehend terrorists outside of the United States. When ter-
rorists wanted for violation of U.S. law are at large overseas, their return
for prosecution shall be a matter of the highest priority and shall be a
continuing issue in bilateral relations with any state that harbors or assists
them. Where we do not have adequate arrangements, the Departments of
State and Justice shall work to resolve the problem, where possible and
appropriate, through negotiation and conclusion of new extradition trea-
ties.
6
Ironically, just before his inauguration, then President-elect
Clinton reacted with a different attitude on extraterritorial abductions
in the Alvarez-Machain case.7 In that case, U.S. drug agents were
implicated in the seizure of a Mexican doctor involved in the tortu-
ous murder of a U.S. drug agent In response to the U.S. Supreme
Court decision affirming U.S. jurisdiction, Clinton announced that
the Court had gone,
way too far.... The Supreme Court ruled that unless the [extradition]
treaty explicitly forbids it, our country was free to go into Mexico or into
any other country that we had a similar treaty with and take someone out.
vertently made public, condones the abduction of terrorists by force from countries
that refuse to cooperate in their extradition).
3. U.S. Willing to 'Snatch' Terrorists Part of Directive Inadvertently Re-
leased, COMM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Feb. 5, 1997, at A4.
4. U.S. May Nab Terrorism Suspects, A Directive Indicates We Would Snatch
Suspects From Another Country if Necessary, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 1997,
at A3.
5. John Diamond, U.S. Authorities Allowed to Abduct Terrorists, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio) Feb. 5, 1997, at 1 A.
6. Presidential Decision Directive-39, June 21, 1995, § 2 (emphasis added).
The language "where possible and appropriate" creates the option that the United
States can act unilaterally without the consent, knowledge or assistance, of the
harboring state should that state choose not to negotiate. Id.
7. See Clinton Objects to Ruling on Extradition Treaty, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 16,
1992, at A5.
8. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
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My own opinion is that that is too broad a policy for our country to have.9
Before President Clinton publicly released PDD-39, it became ap-
parent that he was reconsidering his position. On July 15, 1993, Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, in cooperation with Nige-
rian authorities, abducted a Palestinian, Omar Mohammod All
Rezaq, in Lagos after he was denied entry into Nigeria. 10 A U.S.
court issued an arrest warrant for Rezaq after he killed one American
on a hijacked plane in 1985. Malta officials captured, convicted, and
sentenced Rezaq to 25 years imprisonment. Under Libyan pressure,
however, Malta officials released Rezaq who then fled to Ghana. The
FBI arranged for Ghanaian authorities to ship Rezaq to Nigeria
where, due to political upheaval, an abduction would have gone rela-
tively unnoticed."'
On June 15, 1997, subsequent to the presidential endorsement and
publication of PDD-39, a team of FBI agents apprehended Mir Aimal
Kansi in a hotel near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 2 The FBI
suspected Kansi of being the gunman in a January 25, 1993 attack,
which took place outside the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
headquarters. The attack resulted in the killing of two CIA employ-
ees and the wounding of three others. White House officials refused
to release specific details about the abduction and reasoned that pos-
sible future actions against other terrorists warranted silence on this
matter. President Clinton said the episode underscored the nation's
determination to pursue terrorism "no matter how long it takes, no
matter where they hide." 3 To date, many questions on the precise
facts remain unanswered.
Many believe that the United States negotiated a highly unusual
diplomatic agreement with Pakistan and, thus, enabled U.S. agents to
enter its territory and abduct a Pakistani national. The fact that legal
recourse was unavailable means that customary extradition proce-
dures were suspended. The Pakistanis probably wanted to remove
9. Clinton Objects to Ruling on Extradition Treaty supra note 7, at A5.
10. See FBI Arrests Hiacker in Nigeria, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 1993, at A10
(documenting the arrest of airplane hijacker Omar Mohammod All Rezaq).
11. See id
12. See David Jackson, U.S. Claims Victories in Terrorism Cases, DALLAS
MoRNiG NEWs, June 19, 1997, at 9A.
13. Id
1997]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
any official involvement because consent or willful blindness of this
type of operation in a Muslim country is a highly sensitive matter,
both politically and religiously. A second reason may be an effort by
both countries to protect their sources from family vengeance. This
operation was conducted as a direct result of PDD-39. Kansi's post-
ing on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted List only seemed to confirm the
Administration's justification of its actions based on PDD-39.
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL ABDUCTIONS IN A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The media's attention-grabbing headlines of this presidential di-
rective are rather surprising, considering that incidents of interna-
tional abductions before the U.S. courts date back as early as 1835."4
The practice of extraterritorial abductions developed from the inter-
national law theory of "reprisal," which occurs when a state forcibly
takes something from another state or other entity in satisfaction for
an injury suffered by the former and caused by the latter.' 5 Extrater-
ritorial abductions can occur despite the existence of an extradition
treaty between the two nations involved since most treaties do not
obligate the asylum state to surrender the suspect to the requesting
state. 16 Despite the existence of over 102 extradition agreements be-
tween the United States and other nations, no international conven-
tion or U.S. law explicitly prohibits extraterritorial abductions. 7 The
only attempt at such a prohibition is a non-binding U. N. Resolution 8
passed in response to the 1960 Israeli abduction of Adolph Eichmann
from Argentina.' 9 In that Resolution, the U.N. proclaimed that Arti-
14. See State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118 (1835).
15. See Kristin Berdan Weissman, Extraterritorial Abduction: The Endanger-
ment of Future Peace, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 459, 465 (1994) (discussing the ori-
gins of extraterritorial abduction).
16. See id, at 468 (expressing the views of several commentators who opined
that extradition tries as "an intent to abide by the customary international law pre-
cept of respect for international territorial boundaries.").
17. See id at467.
18. See HANs KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONs 293-95 (1966) (ex-
plaining that unless the U.N. Security Council takes the necessary steps under Ar-
ticle 39 of the U.N. Charter, U.N. Resolutions remain non-binding on member
states).
19. See U.N. Scor 138, 15' Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc S/INF/15/Rev. 1 (1960) (pro-
claiming that extraterritorial abductions are incompatible with the U.N. Charter).
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cle 2 prohibits extraterritorial abductions without the consent of the
asylum nation.20 To date, the U.N. has not amended its Charter or
passed a declaration specifically prohibiting extraterritorial abduc-
tions.2 Further, the International Court of Justice has not heard any
cases involving extraterritorial abductions, but it has analyzed territo-
rial integrity in a number of cases.' There is, however, a suggestion
by some authors that international law prohibits one state from exer-
cising its police power in the territory of another state.'
The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law provides the cus-
tomary international law perspective that an agent of a state may not
seize a person from another nation without first obtaining govern-
mental consent from that nation.2 4 Customary law also requires the
abducting state to return the individual if the home state objects to
the abduction and, thus, demands the return of the suspect.' This is
not, however, the typical remedy. One commentator opined that "the
only established remedies [for international abductions] are repara-
tions and diplomatic apologies; the additional remedy of the return of
the person seized unlawfully is not yet recognized, although some
courts have seen fit to apply it.",26 Another commentator noted that
calls for the return of those abducted "have succeeded only inter-
mittently and usually in a semipolitical, semilegal context." 2
7
20. See Weissman, supra note 15, at 473.
21. See id. at 477 (noting that the lack of a binding agreement on extraterrito-
rial abduction negatively impacts international peace and security).
22. See id. at 475 (explaining that the absence of an international agreement on
extraterritorial abductions presents challenges for international courts in resolving
these issues).
23. For a provocative note castigating international abductions, see Jonathon P.
Gluck, The Customary International Law of State-Sponsored International Abduc-
tion and United States Courts, 44 DUKE L.J. 612 (1994) (examining the historical
cases of state-sponsored international abduction). For purposes of clarity in this
essay, a constant assumption will be that the United States is targeting a terrorist
who previously attacked American interests or is planning to do so based on the
reasoning that in many cases, those who attacked the United States are in a con-
stant mode of planning new attacks.
24. See RESTATEENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, § 432(2) cmt. c (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
25. See id.
26. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADmON: UNITED STATES
LAW AND PRACTICE 217 (1987).
27. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Lmv Enforcement Abroad: The Constitu-
tion and International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 475 (1990) (as-
serting three primary reasons in support of the author's argument that state-
1997]
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Since no governing or judicial body has interpreted and conclu-
sively ruled on extraterritorial abductions, countries that want to
challenge an extraterritorial abduction must research the authority
found in the annals of customary international law.
III. JUSTIFICATION FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL
ABDUCTION OF CRIMINALS: THE USE OF FORCE
Customary international law provides that territorial sovereignty
secures a state's exclusive control over everything within its terri-
tory.28 States have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of an-
other state or perform acts of sovereignty on its soil.2 9 Consequently,
it is a violation of customary international law to abduct someone in
a foreign country. One commentator argues that the practice of inter-
national abduction violates international law by infringing upon sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity of other states and, thus, disrupts
world order.3" This, however, is customary law, which is subject to
change and modification by continued practice within the interna-
tional community." In fact, changing attitudes on the abduction issue
mean that this practice is now accepted under international law in
limited instances.3
2
In order to carry out an extraterritorial abduction, the abducting
state must establish jurisdiction through prescriptive or enforcement
jurisdiction. " Prescriptive jurisdiction authorizes a state to apply its
sponsored abduction violates international law).
28. See MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 253 (Max Sorenson ed.,
1968).
29. See D. Cameron Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the
United States: Issues of International and Domestic Law, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 16
(1988) (discussing sovereignty and territorial integrity).
30. Terry Richard Kane, Prosecuting International Terrorists in the United
States Courts: Gaining the Jurisdictional Threshold, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 294, 336
(1987) citing Bassiouni, supra note 26, (including abduction in a list of alterna-
tives to extradition of international terrorists).
31. See Andrew Wolfenson, The U.S. Courts and the Treatment of Suspects
Abducted Abroad Under International Law, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 705, 707
(1989-90) (discussing the relationship of international law to extraterritorial ab-
ductions).
32. See id. at 708 (asserting that the torture or mistreatment of an abductee by
the abducting agent continues to be illegal under international law).
33. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, pt. IV introductory note (explaining the
concepts of prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction).
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substantive law to specific persons and events. There are five types
of prescriptive jurisdiction: protective (if a national interest is in-
jured); 4 passive personality (nationality of the victim);" universal
(whether the offense is considered particularly heinous and harmful
to humanity);36 territorial (place where the offense is committed);3'
and national (nationality of the actor).3" Enforcement jurisdiction
authorizes a state to take measures to induce or compel compliance
with its laws.39
According to one international law scholar, Derek Bowett, sending
agents into a state's territory to specifically target a criminal does not
violate the territorial integrity or political independence of the state.4"
In addition, Mr. Bowett gives an example of one state using due dili-
gence in two situations: to prevent a terrorist attack on another state
or if its nationals are unable to prevent groups from organizing or
carrying out these activities. Since the state is using due diligence, it
is not breaching any duty toward other states. Thus, the target state
may not attempt any actions in self-defense. The target state, how-
ever, is not powerless because it may act in self-defense so long as it
acts solely against the individuals responsible for the threat.4 '
Mr. Bowett further clarifies his position and argues that "[t]he ac-
tion which it is necessary to take against an expedition still within the
34. See id § 402 cmt. f(defining protective jurisdiction as the right of a state to
punish offenses committed by non-nationals outside its territory if the integrity of
that state's governmental function is threatened).
35. See id cmt. g (commenting that this jurisdictional basis has not been ac-
cepted for ordinary torts or crimes and is only applicable to terrorist and other at-
tacks on a state's nationals).
36. See id § 403 (explaining that a state imposes punishment for certain of-
fenses regardless of the territoriality of the act or the nationality of the actors and
victims).
37. See id § 402 cmt. c (describing the principle of territoriality as the most
common basis for the use of prescriptive jurisdiction).
38. See id cmt. e (stating that international law recognizes the right of a state
to exercise jurisdiction based on domicile or residence as well as nationality).
39. See id § 431 (noting that prescriptive jurisdiction is a prerequisite for en-
forcement jurisdiction).
40. See DEREK W. BoWETT, SELF DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1958)
(discussing the use of forcible self-help against terrorists).
41. See BOWETr, supra note 40, at 56 (considering the role of self-defense in
actions against individuals or groups); see also Findlay, supra note 29, at 29-30
(asserting that the inherent right of self-defense may justify an extraterritorial ab-
duction).
1997]
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jurisdiction of the state of its origin must not be considered as di-
rected against the state so invaded."42 Considering that the actions of
espionage or law enforcement agents within a nation's territory have
never been considered a use of force under international law,43 it
follows that targeting a terrorist for abduction from another state is
not necessarily a violation of international law. More accurately, this
is an interpretation of a state's right to defend itself.
Mr. Bowett's reasoning also supports two other justifications for
using force when abducting terrorists in another state. Under the first
justification, a state can seize a terrorist in another country as long as
the capture is necessary to prevent future harm to its citizens and the
mission's objectives are strictly confined to that task." The capture
and successful punishment of terrorists would not only prevent future
attacks by the terrorists involved but would also deter other terrorists
from targeting that state or its citizens again. Therefore, even if the
terrorist has already struck, his abduction is justifiable as preventing
a future attack.
The second justification is self-defense. Broadly construed, the use
of force in extraterritorial abductions is considered self-defense if the
abduction satisfies the requirements of necessity and proportionality
and the abducting state acted in collaboration with the territorial
state.45 Necessity requires that the terrorist act be sudden and unex-
pected, therefore compelling an immediate response.46 The propor-
tionality element limits the measures so as to "not exceed in manner
or aim the action provoking them."47 Therefore, a state may cross the
border of another state in order to capture a terrorist without neces-
sarily violating that state's sovereignty. An abduction committed
42. BOWETT supra note 40, at 152 (asserting that a territorial invasion in self-
defense is not a violation of territorial sovereignty or political independence).
43. See id. at 25 (commenting that some forms of non-violent self-help may be
permissive in response to terrorist activities).
44. See id. at 29 (discussing the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as a jus-
tification for extraterritorial abduction).
45. See id. at 30 (describing when the abduction of terrorists constitutes an act
in self-defense).
46. See JOHN BASSETT MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906)
(citing a letter from Daniel Webster to the British Minister at Washington dis-
cussing the exceptions to territorial sovereignty).
47. Findlay, supra note 29, at 27-28 (providing examples of proportionate re-
sponses to terrorist acts around the world).
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externally of a state's borders, however, would qualify as aggression
through the use of force because that type of conduct violates the jus
cogens, or higher norms of non-intervention, as codified in the
United Nations Charter.4" Either justification, the prevention of future
harm or self defense, might have been used by a state acting on the
following series of events. French officials permitted George Habash,
head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, an extrem-
ist offshoot of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to enter and
seek medical treatment in France." Another terrorist, Ahmed Jibril,
who heads the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command, boasted "that he, too, recently traveled for health rea-
sons-twice to Switzerland and once to France."50 If countries such
as France and Switzerland do not follow international conventions
that provide the means to apprehend, prosecute, and/or extradite a
terrorist, other states are left with little choice but to try and assert ju-
risdiction to avoid putting the harboring state in a position where it
may be subjected to retaliation.
The classic Caroline case,5" which is the standard for using force
as a measure of self-defense, provides insight into the reasoning of
Secretary of State Daniel Webster. The Caroline incident was not
actually a case, but rather a set of correspondences between Webster
and the British Minister at Washington discussing a British violation
of United States sovereignty. During an 1837 rebellion in colonial
Canada, Americans volunteered and offered supplies to the Canadian
colonists. The American ship Caroline carried men and supplies from
the United States to Canada. Since American authorities did not in-
tercede, British and Canadian loyalist troops crossed the border into
the United States, boarded the Caroline docked at Fort Schlosser, and
set her on fire. The ship then drifted over Niagara Falls and was de-
stroyed. The attack resulted in the deaths of two Americans aboard
48. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2, 7 (setting forth the general principles for which
all member nations must follow).
49. See Charles Fenyvesi, Washington Whispers, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP.,
Feb. 24, 1992, at 26 (commenting on the medical treatment of two Palestinian ter-
rorists in Western Europe).
50. Id
51. See John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treat), and Rationalist Inter-
national Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Lmv of
State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1, 126 (describing generally the Caroline in-
cident).
1997]
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the ship, and, subsequently, U.S. officials arrested a Canadian loyal-
ist for their murder. The British claimed that they destroyed the ship
docked in the United States in self-defense 52
Secretary Webster explained that a state must demonstrate that the
"necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." 3 The British ar-
gued that the attack was legal and conducted in compliance with
Webster's definition of self-defense in response to the ship's previ-
ous activities, future threats posed by the Caroline, and the United
States' unwillingness to take action. Although the Americans did not
agree, they accepted British apologies and closed the case in 1842.
Necessity may be a difficult criterion to satisfy as it relates to ab-
ductions. In the context of abducting terrorists, however, an expan-
sive understanding of this doctrine would no doubt conclude that a
deliberate operation to abduct those, who by their nature are overly
clandestine, could be necessary. One must also consider Webster's
comments in a present-day context where "instant" and "over-
whelming" have quite different meanings than they did 153 years
ago. The imminence of the attack must be determined on a case-by-
case basis. "The greater the relative threat, the more likely preemp-
tive actions are to be effective, and therefore, the greater the justifi-
cation for acting before the enemy can complete preparations and
mount its aggressive attack." 14 The United States continues to adhere
to Webster's principle argument that the threat of an imminent attack
gives rise to the right of anticipatory self-defense. The majority of
criminal law theories provide a basis by which one may use force in
order to defend oneself. If a person reasonably believes that he is in
imminent danger of an unlawful bodily harm, he may use the amount
of force that is reasonably necessary to prevent such harm. Most
American jurisdictions reject the common law "duty to retreat" rule,
52. See MOORE, supra note 47, at 409-11 (describing the circumstances sur-
rounding the destruction of the Caroline).
53. Id at 412.
54. Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and
Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 647 (1992) (concluding that each situa-
tion must be analyzed contextually before the standard of imminence can be de-
termined).
55. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing a presidential directive
asserting the U.S. position on extraterritorial abduction).
148 [13:139
ABDUCTING TERRORISTS
whereby instead of using deadly force to defend oneself, one must
retreat if a safe opportunity exists.
Proportionality is a criterion more difficult to measure since the
terrorist attack may not have occurred at the time that a nation targets
a terrorist for abduction. While a country such as the United States
has greater military capabilities than a terrorist group, it still does not
always have the luxury to wait and let other defensive measures run
their course. It may be proposed, however, that the force used in a
preemptive strike is a minimal amount necessary under the circum-
stances. If the United States delays, the opportunity to react might be
lost and the result will be dead Americans. 6
While American criminal law has little bearing on international
law per se, it does provide the basic components of an explanation
for using force against a terrorist. Our military and intelligence serv-
ices should be permitted under the law to prevent a terrorist attack in
the same way that police officers stop a fleeing felon. As the tactics,
weaponry, and targets of terrorists change, so should the legal pa-
rameters surrounding the use of force. It is irrational to suggest that a
state must refrain from acting until a terrorist first attacks it. For over
one hundred years, American jurisprudence wrestled with the issue
of extraterritorial abductions. Many cases support the proposition of
abducting terrorists from foreign countries, with or without the har-
boring state's consent, to bring the suspect before a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.
IV. U.S. CASE LAW
In Ker v. llinois, 7 the appellant fled to Peru following an indict-
ment in Illinois for larceny and embezzlement." The victim bank
dispatched a private investigator with an extradition warrant. Since
Chilean armed forces were occupying the capital, Peruvian authori-
ties never received the warrant. A U.S. agent seized Ker and forced
him to board a ship to Honolulu and then another ship to San Fran-
cisco.59 Next, the agent turned Ker over to an agent of the Governor
56. See id at 648 (asserting that the timing of a preemptive strike is critical).
57. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
58. Seeid at437.
59. See Ker, 119 U.S. at 438 (explaining that United States agents refused to
present extradition papers to Peruvian government officials).
19971
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of Illinois and transported him to Chicago. Ker contended that the
agents violated his due process rights and Justice Miller wrote "For
mere irregularities in the manner in which he may be brought into the
custody of the law, we do not think he is entitled to say that he
should not be tried at all for the crime with which he is charged in a
regular indictment."60
In Frisbie v. Collins,61 Michigan police traveled to Chicago, then
forcibly seized, handcuffed, and blackjacked the petitioner and re-
turned him to Michigan to stand trial.6 2 The Court held that "[t]he
power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the
fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason
of a forcible 'abduction.' 63
The courts developed what is now referred to as the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine. This doctrine holds that a forcible abduction neither offends
due process nor requires a court to free a suspect seized in violation
of international law.' Many courts follow the male captus bene de-
tentus rule, which stems from the Ker and Frisbie cases.65 This rule
holds that a court need not divest itself of in personam jurisdiction
over a defendant based on the methodology employed to arrest and
bring a defendant before the court.66 The Court further stated that
while an arrest may be unlawful and unconstitutional, the exclusion-
ary rule applies to evidence, not people.67
Later, in United States v. Toscanino,68 a jury convicted the defen-
60. Id. at 440.
61. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
62. See id. at 520.
63. See id. at 522 (referring to the "rule announced" in Ker, 119 U.S. at 436).
64. See generally Lowenfeld, supra note 27, at 444 (describing the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine as the ability of a U.S. court to "[t]ry a person brought before it for a
crime over which it has jurisdiction-regardless of how the accused came before
the court").
65. See id. at 465 (citing Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 715-17 (1988)
(Bradley, J., dissenting) (basing its decision on the ruling in Ker, 119 U.S. 436
(1886)).
66. See id (explaining that jurisdiction is not impaired by the manner in which
the accused is brought before the Court).
67. See id. at 460 (justifying why the unlawful seizure of documents leads to
annulment of the seizure, while the unlawful seizure of a person does not lead to
annulment).
68. 500 F.2d 267 (2d. Cir. 1974), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (1974), motion
to dismiss denied on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y 1975).
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dant for conspiracy to import narcotics into the United States.69 The
defendant claimed that Uruguayan police acting on behalf of the
United States brought him to Brazil.70 Prior to Toscanino's transpor-
tation to the United States by United States agents, Brazilian officials
tortured and drugged him. The Court held that jurisdiction could be
lost in the United States only if the methods of abduction were "de-
liberate, unnecessary and [an] unreasonable invasion of the accused's
constitutional rights."71
One year later in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, " the
Court refined the holding in Toscanino by stating that in order for a
court to surrender its jurisdiction, the agent's "conduct [must be] of a
most shocking and outrageous character,"" and limited to "torture,
brutality and similar outrageous conduct."74 In Gerstein v. Pugh,"
the Supreme Court held that "an illegal arrest does not void a subse-
quent conviction."76 In 1986, Congress authorized the FBI to exer-
cise "long arm" jurisdiction to abduct terrorists located outside of
U.S. borders.77 Similarly, the Bush Administration embraced an ad-
visory opinion that confirmed the FBI's ability to engage in extrater-
ritorial abductions without the consent of the asylum state. 8 As if to
confirm their authority, in June of 1989, the Department of Justice
issued a legal opinion stating that federal law enforcement agents
have legal authority to arrest suspected criminals overseas without
69. See id at 268.
70. See id. at 269 (providing Toscanino's statement which states that he was
lured from home by a telephone call placed by Hugo Campos Hermedia, who was
"acting ultra vires in that he was the paid agent of the United States government").
71. See id at 275 (holding that Ker and Frisbie must yield to the Supreme
Court's expansion of due process "[w]hich now protects the accused against pre-
trial illegality by denying to the government the fruits of its exploitation of any
deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness on its part").
72. 510 F.2d 62 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
73. Id at 65.
74. Id
75. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
76. Id at 119.
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1994).
78. See Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override Interna-
tional Law in Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities, 13 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 163 (1989) [hereinafter F.B.I. Authority to Override International Lav].
The Opinion offered the position that the FBI could legally violate customary in-
ternational law and U.N. Charter art. 2(4) while engaging in extraterritorial abduc-
tions. See id
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the consent of the country where the arrest is made.79 As a general
proposition, Justice Brandeis opined:
If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means-to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to
secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribu-
tion.
80
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court gave
the political branches of government wide discretion on the method-
ology used to bring a criminal to the United States. The court stated
that "[i]f there are to be restrictions on searches and seizures which
occur incident to such American action, they must be imposed by the
political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legis-
lation."82 Clearly the U.S. Administration has the legal and political
ability to use force in abducting a criminal. As long as the conduct
involved is not "shocking," the method used to capture the defen-
dant rests with the executive branch of the government.
Finally, in the latest series of cases involving jurisdiction and ab-
duction, the Court in United States v. Alvarez-Machain83 questioned
"whether a criminal defendant, abducted to the United States from a
nation with which it has an extradition treaty, thereby acquires a de-
fense to the jurisdiction of this country's courts."" The Court held
that the presence of a treaty does not entitle a defendant to an auto-
matic defense. Furthermore, the Court stated: "To infer from this
Treaty and its terms that it prohibits all means of gaining the pres-
ence of an individual outside of its terms goes beyond established
precedent and practice." 85 The rationale of the Court was that "[t]he
history of negotiation and practice under the Treaty also fails to show
that abductions outside of the Treaty constitute a violation of the
79. See id.
80. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
81. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
82. Id. at 275.
83. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
84. Id. at 657.
85. Id. at 668-69.
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Treaty," 6 and is, therefore, an option available to both parties.
V. THE CASE FOR ABDUCTING TERRORISTS
Transnational crimes such as the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103
illustrate how terrorists can literally and figuratively "get away with
murder." At times a unilateral effort to abduct the suspect extraterri-
tonally may be the only method to effectuate an arrest and bring the
suspect before the court. The formal extradition process is a labori-
ous and generally inefficient procedure. In addition, the extradition
of suspects may be in contravention of a state's own laws and may
also lead corrupt government officials to assist a suspect's escape.
Armed with legal justification, a state is entitled to engage in extra-
territorial abductions. The U.S. has addressed this issue for nearly
two centuries. To date, case law, executive orders, and domestic ju-
dicial policy all overwhelmingly support the seizure of a criminal
suspect beyond the borders of the United States.
One of the goals or purposes of a government is to protect the
lives of its citizens. To that end, the government has an obligation to
use all of its resources to achieve that goal. Leaders cannot dwell on
individual citizen objections to governmental counter-terrorism
measures. The battle against terrorism is a continuous undertaking,
and each measure must be part of an overall strategy. History has
taught us that it is not a question of" if," but "when" a terrorist will
strike. Therefore, it is contingent upon the government to keep up the
pressure on terrorists and to continually develop and execute irregu-
lar methods of countering terrorists. The government must exercise
those measures even if the world community adversely reacts to the
measures. Diplomatic outcries are usually self-serving pronounce-
ments for the countries making them. Historically, these rhetorical
exercises have not saved a single U.S. citizen from terrorists.
Beyond the political, social, and moral concerns of a civilized so-
ciety, there is pragmatism. Pragmatism in conjunction with legal
principles and norms of justice help a country define its options to
act preemptively or reactively to a terrorist threat or attack against its
citizens and interests.
President Clinton's power to sign PDD-39 stemmed from his in-
86. at 665.
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herent authority in the executive branch of the government to enforce
the law and proscribe the manner in which law enforcement is con-
ducted.87 Once an individual violates a law, agents of the U.S. Gov-
ernment acting on behalf of an executive, can seek out and arrest the
suspect. The violation is then a matter for the courts to assess in light
of a judicial interpretation of the underlying criminal offense. The
judicial branch does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the
manner used to bring the suspect before the court is legal. Instead,
the courts have jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the ab-
duction and to question whether governmental officials violated the
suspect's rights.88
Abducting a terrorist from another country is a means of attaining
jurisdiction without having to assess the impact or permissibility of
jurisdiction under an extradition treaty.89 If an extradition treaty is
not present, then countries do not violate international law when they
abduct individuals because the "law of nations" is not activated.90
As a general principle, however, international law recognizes the
right of a country to apply its law extraterritorially. Therefore,
American law can apply beyond its borders.9' International law does
not require a nation to remain silent and idle while terrorists attack its
citizens. Without this right, international law would enable a foreign
country to refuse extradition and, thus, protect a suspect wanted in
the United States. Therefore, if a country invites U.S. law enforce-
ment agents into its borders to investigate a crime, there should be no
challenge to United States assertion of jurisdiction over the suspect.
Further extending that logic, if a nation harbors and conceals a fugi-
tive terrorist suspect, that nation should not then rise and proclaim a
87. See F.B.I. Authority to Override International Law, supra note 79, at 174
(stating that pursuant "to the constitutional command to 'take care that the laws be
faithfully executed,' the president has the power to authorize agents of the execu-
tive branch to engage in law enforcement activities in addition to those provided
by statute").
88. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974) (ques-
tioning whether the government used "deliberate" and "unnecessary lawlessness"
and holding that due process protects accused against such illegality).
89. Arthur E. Shin, On the Borders of Law Enforcement-The Use ofExtrater-
ritorial Abduction as a Means of Attaining Jurisdiction Over the International
Criminal, 17 WHITTIER L. REv., 327, 384-85 (1995).
90. See id.
91. Seeid. at388.
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violation of its sovereignty when the abduction is simply an effort to
dispense justice, which inarguably would be attempted, supported,
and defended by most nations.
President Clinton's execution of PDD-39 did not explore new le-
gal grounds of attaining jurisdiction, nor did it create new tactics to
bring terrorists before U.S. courts. It simply reaffred a legal theo-
rem that has a 160-year history of practical applications. In assessing
modem threats, one should not be lulled into automatically focusing
on extraterritorial abductions of foreigners. Among some quarters
within the United States, there is an apparent radical shift among ex-
tremist groups willing to carry out attacks against fellow Americans.
It is not a stretch of one's imagination to envision a domestic attack
carried out by an American citizen who then seeks and receives ref-
uge in a rogue nation such as Syria, Libya, or Sudan. It is somehow
easier to accept that a nation has a right to extraterritorially abduct
one of its own, rather than a foreign national. The focus must remain
on the nationality of the victim or target state, not on the citizenship
of the attacker.
The abduction of Kansi illustrates the problem. Kansi fled the
United States and was harbored by his wealthy family clan in Paki-
stan and Afghanistan. During the past four-and-one-half years offi-
cial government authorities were disinterested, too corrupt, or other-
wise unable to capture Kansi and return him to trial. Due to the
largely unilateral measures undertaken by the United States, Kansi
will finally be subject to the long overdue American brand ofjustice.
VI. CONCLUSION
The utilization of extraterritorial abductions is, and should remain,
limited. This essay does not support the position that abducting ter-
rorists should be a liberally exercised policy. Abductions should be
exercised only in those situations when all other avenues of attaining
jurisdiction have been exhausted. Abrogation of a nation's ability to
abduct suspects wanted for heinous crimes, such as terrorism, only
invites more such acts with the perpetrators seeking sanctuary in
some sympathetic, anti-American, anti-justice nation. Any sovereign
nation that has been attacked must, if all other diplomatic options
have been exhausted, maintain the unilateral right to dictate the time,
place, and manner in which it reaches out, captures the attackers, and
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brings them into a court of law.
Due to modem political realities and global anti-American senti-
ment, abductions are at times the only viable option to bring a sus-
pect within the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. As long as
a person's illegal actions have harmful consequences within the
United States, or against its global interests, that person is subject to
the laws and penalties of the U.S. criminal code. To assume anything
else, would create a defacto and dejure exemption from prosecution
for those who seek to harm the United States. This is completely un-
acceptable.
